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a b s t r a c t 
Many governments aim to improve the labour market outcomes of people living in deprived areas through "place- 
making" initiatives. Economists are often sceptical about the effectiveness of such policies, but empirical evidence 
on their impacts remains limited. We examine the impact of building subsidised business floor space in deprived 
neighbourhoods in the UK. Our estimates suggest that while the £8.2bn investment into these projects increased 
























































Many governments spend large amounts of money on area-based ini-
iatives aimed to improve economic outcomes in deprived neighbour-
oods. Despite their popularity, the economic (and broader) impacts
f such programmes are uncertain both theoretically and empirically.
rban economists have traditionally been sceptical about the potential
enefits of such policies ( Glaeser and Gottlieb 2008 ), although recent
ork presents arguments for their application in the most distressed ar-
as ( Austin et al., 2018 ). The empirical uncertainty persists even though
hese programmes have been the subject of extensive, and often expen-
ive, evaluations by governments ( Nolan and Wong, 2004 ). Part of the
roblem reflects a general weakness in government-sponsored evalua-
ions ( National Audit Office, 2013 ). However, it is increasingly recog-
ised that, in part, this uncertainty arises because of methodological
hallenges: it is often hard to assess the causal impact of policy inter-
entions that are not randomly assigned, especially if evaluation has not
een embedded into policy design. 
Academic researchers have developed several identification strate-
ies to help address the problem of identifying the causal effects of area-
ased initiatives. To date, these methods have primarily been directed
t understanding the impact of offering financial incentives to firms to
ocate in well-defined areas. However, less attention has been paid to
idely used policies, where the nature of the treatment and the def-
nition of the target area are less sharply defined. This paper applies∗ Corresponding author. 
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094-1190/© 2020 Published by Elsevier Inc. tate-of-the-art empirical methods to evaluate the long-term effects of
uch a programme. 
We examine the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) launched in 1994
ith the aim of enhancing the quality of life of local people in deprived
eighbourhoods in the UK. It offered support through both individual-
evel investment (e.g. training) and through improvements to the built
nvironment, particularly through investments in subsidised commer-
ial developments and enhancement of physical infrastructure. The ra-
ionale was to overcome barriers to small business development in
laces that had suffered physical decline due, for example, to loss of
lder traditional industries. The intention was for development and re-
urbishment of business premises to catalyse further growth in busi-
esses and jobs in the area (see Rhodes et al., 2007 , Part 3, Chapter
3 for a more extended discussion). However, in contrast to many other
lace-based policies, such as US Empowerment Zones, the SRB did not
ontain direct fiscal incentives to firms or defined sharp boundaries for
he targeted areas. 
Similar to many other comparable programmes, administrative data
n the spatial allocation of funding of SRB is incomplete and not publicly
vailable. We address this problem by identifying the subset of interven-
ions that involved the building of subsidised business floor space and
athering information on these projects through an extensive data col-
ection effort. We are able to identify areas targeted by this type of inter-
ention at a fine spatial scale for 165 projects funded between 1994 and
002 with a total expenditure of £8.2bn. Of this total, £1.5bn is funded



















































































































E  y central government through the SRB with the remainder coming from
ocal government, other government bodies, the EU and the private sec-
or. 
We use a number of alternative approaches to evaluate the causal
mpact of the scheme, the extent to which any effects are the result of
isplacement, and the individual versus the area effects of policy. Our
esults suggest that the programme increased workplace employment in
argeted areas but had no impact on the employment rates of local res-
dents. We reach this conclusion with the help of remarkably detailed
ata and several complementary identification strategies. Our data come
rom the GB Population Census and an administrative register of busi-
esses (the Business Structure Database), which allow us to consider the
mpacts on a variety of outcomes at a very fine spatial scale. 
Our first empirical strategy is to simply compare changes in the num-
er of jobs and the employment rates in locations close to an SRB site
o observationally identical locations elsewhere. We then compare lo-
ations close to an SRB project to locations further away from the same
RB project. Finally, we examine the effect on employment rates by
omparing areas close to SRB projects to similarly defined control ar-
as, close to locations that only receive SRB funding in later periods
due to data limitations, we are not able to use this strategy for work-
lace employment). All of these approaches lead to similar conclusions.
ogether, they also allow us to assess both the impact on targeted areas
s well as possible spillover effects to the larger neighbourhood. 
This paper adds to the small, but growing literature that takes
dentification seriously when evaluating the impact of spatial inter-
entions. For a recent review of place-based policies of this type,
ee Neumark and Simpson (2015) . Earlier contributions, mostly focus-
ng on US Enterprise or Empowerment Zones (EZ), had often recog-
ised the need for valid controls but struggled to find appropri-
te controls. See, for example, Dabney (1991) , Papke (1993 , 1994 ),
oarnet and Bogart (1996) , Bondonio and Engberg (2000) , Peters and
isher (2002) , O’Keefe (2004) , Bondonio and Greenbaum (2007) and
eviews by Bartik (1991) , Nolan and Wong (2004) . Several institutional
eatures of US EZs – specifically the fact that interventions are spa-
ially bounded (i.e. restricted to certain areas) and involve a limited
umber of well documented interventions – have allowed recent pa-
ers to more effectively deal with the problem of non-random place-
ent. Busso and Kline (2008) , and Busso et al. (2013) made signifi-
ant progress in terms of identification, by using rejected and future
Zs as a control group. Similar strategies have been used in Krupka and
oonan (2009) , Hanson (2009) , and Reynolds and Rohlin (2015) .
eumark and Kolko (2010) , Ham et al. (2011) and Hanson and
ohlin (2013) developed complementary strategies that used nearby
reated areas as controls. A series of papers – Gobillon et al. (2012) ,
ivord et al. (2013) , Mayneris et al. (2017) – used combinations of
hese strategies to study the effects of the French Zone Franche Urbaines
ZFUs). 1 Gibbons (2015) and Einiö and Overman (2020) – building on
ethods developed during early stages of the current paper – used more
nely spatially detailed data to further develop identification strategies
ased on comparisons to nearby untreated areas. 
Our contribution is twofold. First, we evaluate the impacts of the
rimary place-making policy implemented in the UK in the 1990s and
he early 2000s. In contrast to the earlier evaluation of this policy, our
ork is based on modern empirical approaches and detailed data (partly
ollected by us). 2 Our results suggest that the £8.2bn investment on the1 See also What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth (2015) for a system- 
tic review of evaluations of Enterprize Zones and related Area Based Initiatives. 
2 In comparison, the government funded evaluation of the SRB assessed ‘ad- 
itionality’ through “interviews with project managers and beneficiaries that 
llow relevant counterfactuals, deadweight, displacement and leakage to be es- 
ablished ” ( Rhodes et al., 2007 , Annex A1 p.292). Most economists would view 
his as a bold claim for research based on 20 case study areas and generating 65 
additionality coefficients’. We are unaware of any subsequent research on the 









2 RB failed to achieve its central objective to improve the employment
f people living in the targeted neighbourhoods. We believe this result
s important for academics and policymakers contemplating how to best
elp people living in deprived areas. Second, we combine several em-
irical strategies to evaluate a place-making policy in a context, where
he targeted areas do not have clear boundaries, and the data and pol-
cy documentation are incomplete. These features are shared by many
lace-making policies as well as by other spatial “treatments ” such as
ublic transportation stations, road junctions or stadiums. Evaluating
uch interventions is harder – and the results inevitably less conclusive –
han what is the case for policies such as the EZs and the ZFUs discussed
bove. Nevertheless, we argue that it is important to examine also the
arder-to-evaluate policies using the best possible data and appropri-
te empirical methods. Here, we present an example of how researchers
ay approach such evaluations. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as following. Section 2 de-
cribes the Single Regeneration Budget, which funded the interventions
hat we evaluate. Sections 3 and 4 introduce our data and present de-
criptive statistics. Sections 5 and 6 discuss our empirical strategies and
esults. The final section concludes. 
. The single regeneration budget 
From 1994 to 2002, the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) was
he UK government’s main regeneration fund intended to enhance the
uality of life of local people in deprived areas. 3 It was launched in
ovember 1993 and replaced 20 existing programmes. The fact that
hese existing programmes had different objectives was reflected in the
ariety of objectives to which SRB was expected to contribute. Specif-
cally, projects had to meet at least one of seven strategic objectives:
nhancing employment prospects and skills; encouraging sustainable
conomic growth; improving housing; benefiting ethnic minorities;
ackling crime and safety; protecting and improving the environment;
nd enhancing the quality of life ( Rhodes et al., 2007 ). 
An important challenge for evaluating the SRB is that (i) it did not
ave a predetermined scale and (ii) the content of the funded projects
aried widely. Individual project typically involved various interven-
ions, targeted numerous objectives, and were vague about what con-
tituted a targeted “neighbourhood ”. Given these challenges, and data
imitations, we focus on one particular set of projects – those that involve
he provision or repair of business floor space – and the impact of these
rojects on a small range of outcomes. Focusing on these projects allows
s to precisely locate the project, despite the absence of administrative
ata on SRB projects. These 187 projects (18% of the total SRB projects)
mount to a total expenditure of £8.2bn (of which £1.5bn comes directly
rom the SRB). 4 These projects also involved other social interventions,
.g., programmes aimed to improve local residents’ labour market or
ducational outcomes. Overall, our estimates measure the joint effects
f both the built environment and social interventions. 
Two factors distinguish our research from much of the available liter-
ture focusing on the US Enterprise or Empowerment Zones and French
one Franche Urbaines. First, most of the SRB interventions were in-
ended to regenerate relatively small local areas. 5 In comparison, many
Zs and ZFUs are quite large. Second, while most EZs and ZFUs provide3 Unless otherwise stated, figures in this section are taken from 
hodes et al. (2007) . 
4 For the round 1 to 3 projects, we were able to obtain a detailed breakdown 
f the reported physical outputs for these schemes as including: 4,730,650 metre 
quared business floor space built/improved, 58,746 dwellings built/improved, 
64 hectares of land improved, 401 buildings built/improved, 3 km of road built 
nd 8 community facilities built. 
5 Among all successful bids, 45% of the projects sought to regenerate a small 
ocal area (consisting of a small number of wards, wards being geographical 
nits with an average of around 5000 residents), 20% worked at the level of local 
uthority and the rest at a larger spatial level. But our focus on projects with a 





















































































































7 Shares of residents in different labour market status, age group, education, 
industry, non-white, foreign born, lone parent, living in owner occupied hous- 
ing, living in social housing, crowded housing and means of transport. irect financial support to businesses, SRB expenditure involved only in-
irect support to businesses via improvements to the built environment
r through benefits arising from the associated social interventions. The
ffectiveness of built environment interventions, in particular, has been
uestioned by the UK government in its review of regeneration funding
 Communities and Local Government, 2009 ) and our findings provide
stimates to help inform that debate. 
The SRB funding was allocated in six rounds. The first round of bid-
ing opened in April 1994 with results announced in December 1994
nd the funding starting in March 1995. The sixth and final round was
nnounced in January 2000. During the six rounds between 1994 and
000, the SRB distributed £5.7 billion to 1028 projects. However, it has
een estimated that the total expenditure for SRB related projects was
26 billion ( Rhodes et al., 2007 Executive Summary p.ii), with addi-
ional funding coming from Local Authorities, Training and Enterprise
ouncils (Learning and Skills Councils), the voluntary and private sec-
ors and the European Union. 
SRB funds were allocated on a competitive basis. Bids were invited
rom partnerships which could comprise Local Authorities, Training and
nterprise Councils, private companies, Chambers of Commerce, educa-
ional institutions and voluntary organisations ( John and Ward, 2005 ).
all (2000, p. 4) describes the process as follows: “Each GOR [Govern-
ent Office of the Region] was issued with an indicative SRB Challenge
und allocation. Its task was to compile a package of bids to be recom-
ended to central government. Local partnerships were to submit out-
ine bids which would be formally ‘encouraged’ or ‘discouraged’ by the
OR. They would then decide, on the basis of this guidance, whether the
robability of success merited the submission of a (perhaps amended)
ormal bid. The GOR would then select which bids would be recom-
ended to central government for funding. ”
Unfortunately, relatively little information is available on how GORs
nd Ministers assessed bids. GORs acted in line with recommendations
rom central government. Bidding Guidance (e.g. Department of Envi-
onment, 1994 ) did contain assessment criteria, but these mainly con-
erned the ability to deliver final outputs and to attract matched fund-
ng from sources other than the SRB. It is unclear that these criteria
ould be used to differentiate between bids that had made it through
he GOR screening of bids. What we do know is that even once bids
ade it through GOR screening, rejection rates were reasonably high.
or example, Ward (1997 , citing Hall, 1996 ) reports that only 201 out
f 469 final bids were funded in round 1, while 172 out of 329 bids were
unded in round 2. 
The available guidance and documentation do not resolve all uncer-
ainties about the selection process. However, it appears that, despite
he strategic objectives of SRB, the underlying economic performance
f the area played a relatively minor role in the selection process once
 bid was submitted. John et al. (2004) use data on all submitted bids 6 
o examine the likelihood that a bid was successful as a function of the
packaging’ of the bid (e.g. whether it included a map), the political
haracteristics of the location (e.g. whether it was in the constituency
f a government minister) and measures of deprivation of the location.
hey report that “time and money spent on the preparation of bids,
ather than the content in terms of the government’s objectives, helps
etermine success – the triumph of packaging over substance. ” ( John
t al., 2004 , p. 425) Political manipulation also appears to have played
 minor role in decisions. 
In short, we know that SRB projects target areas that were deprived
roughly a third of the funding was targeted at the 20 most deprived
ocal Authority districts and 80% at the 99 most deprived). But given
he complex decision-making process, and the evidence in John et al.ignificant built environment component means that a much higher percentage 
f our projects will have targeted small local areas. 
6 Sadly, in private correspondence, the authors of this paper confirmed that 






3 hat success had relatively little to do with the local economic or po-
itical situation, we think it is reasonable to assume that the timing of
reatment is independent of area characteristics. This assumption, which
e test by comparing observable characteristics of different areas, un-
erpins our strategy of using future SRB intervention areas as suitable
ontrols, as discussed further below. 
. Data 
The SRB dataset that we use is constructed from a variety of sources.
irst, using project summary documents from the government depart-
ent in charge of regeneration (Communities and Local Government,
r CLG), we identified 187 schemes which included building or im-
roving commercial floor space. In the second stage, we located these
87 schemes using the project summary information provided by CLG
nd the Regional Development Agencies (which took over responsibility
or SRB when they were established in 1999). We also consulted post-
cheme evaluations provided by Local Authorities and RDAs and used
ebsites of specific schemes where available. The process involved an
xtensive search for documents held by a variety of organisations and
everal Freedom of Information requests. Where we succeeded in find-
ng the evaluation document for a particular scheme, we took from it the
pecific locations (longitude and latitude) which had been the target of
hysical improvement works. In this manner, we successfully located,
o varying degrees of accuracy, 165 schemes which included business
oor space improvements. For the remaining 22 projects, we were not
ble to find sufficiently accurate information of their location. 
We have data on a number of outcomes. Data on employment
f those living in the neighbourhood and demographic characteristics
omes from the 1991 and 2001 Censuses. Workplace employment in
he neighbourhood is taken from the Business Structure Database (BSD)
hich provides an annual snapshot of the Inter-Departmental Business
egister (IDBR). This dataset contains information on 2.1 million estab-
ishments, accounting for approximately 99% of economic activity in the
K and includes each business’ name, postcode and total employment. 
Our control variables include resident characteristics 7 and popula-
ion density (from Census 91) and share of land area that is urban. We
ave also used these data sources to construct control variables measur-
ng the characteristics of the larger neighbourhood in which our unit of
bservation are located. For each unit of observation (based on ‘enumer-
tion districts’ – see below), we calculate averages of census variables
n the nearby enumeration districts using three distance bands (within
.5 km, 0.5–1 km and 1–5 km of the unit of observation). 
As discussed above, our aim is to study the impact of SRB projects at
 disaggregated spatial scale. Unfortunately, while all our data sources
eport data at very fine spatial scales, the reporting units differ between
ources. To construct data for a consistent set of spatial units, we use the
991 census enumeration district (ED) as our unit of observation. These
Ds were designed to facilitate data census collection and attempted to
qualise enumerators’ workload. 8 The number of residents in EDs range
etween 24 and 1797 with an average of 433 inhabitants. In compar-
son, the US census tracts typically have between 2500 and 8000 resi-
ents ( Census Bureau, 1994 ). 
The BSD and OS Strategi data are available at a very fine spatial
evel and can easily be aggregated to ED-level. 9 The 2001 census data8 The design of the 1991 EDs included such factors as density of housing; the 
umber of sub-divided properties (bedsits); flats in which individual front doors 
re protected by entry-phone systems; and residents who may not have English 
s their first language. Furthermore, EDs were designed not to straddle major 
oads, rivers, railway lines or extensive areas of open space. ( Martin, 2001 ) 
9 BSD is available at postcode level. OS Strategi is a geometrically structured 
:250 000 scale vector database that defines the real world geographic enti- 
S. Gibbons, H. Overman and M. Sarvimäki Journal of Urban Economics 122 (2021) 103315 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics (sample means by distance to a SRB site). 
Distance from the nearest SRB site 
< 1km 1–2km 2–3km 3–4km 4–5km RoE 
A: Workplace employment 
1997 448 255 182 156 161 184 
2009 470 272 201 172 185 210 
Change 1997 to 2009 26 21 22 17 26 27 
B: Number of residents 
1991 439 454 452 454 471 446 
2001 474 478 474 475 495 475 
C: Employment rate of residents 
1991 0.50 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.56 
2001 0.54 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.63 
Change 1991 to 2001 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 
D: Other resident characteristics in 1991 
Has a higher degree 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Has a degree 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 
Has diploma 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 
Lone parent 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Non-white 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.03 
Foreign born (Commonwealth) 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.02 
Foreign born (RoW) 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.03 
Lives in owner occupied housing 0.55 0.59 0.61 0.64 0.71 0.72 
Lives in social housing 0.33 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.20 0.18 
Does not have a car 0.48 0.43 0.41 0.38 0.32 0.25 
Moved from outside of the ward within x years 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 
Population density (per km 2 ) 7079 7423 7490 6616 4867 3253 
E: Characteristics of the Location 
in London 0.23 0.31 0.36 0.33 0.24 0.04 
Urban 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.91 0.85 0.63 
Number of EDs 8267 9890 9944 7931 5427 61,637 
Source: Authors own calculations using BSD, Census 91 Ordnance Survey Strategi land use database. Statistics are presented for 1km’ bands’ of EDs located within 




















































s reported at Output Area (OA) level. The OAs are smaller than EDs –
ith the average population of 297 – but their borders are typically not
ontained within ED borders. We convert the 2001 census data into EDs
sing weighting based on the overlapping area of the two geographies. 10 
. Descriptive statistics 
We have information on project location and the SRB round in which
he project is funded. As we discuss in detail below, we base our identi-
cation strategy on either project location or timing (or both). With this
n mind, we present descriptive statistics disaggregating by distance to
he project and timing of the project in Tables 1 and 2 , respectively. 
Table 1 present descriptive statistics for: (a) workplace employment;
b) number of residents; (c) the employment rate of residents; (d) other
haracteristics of residents in 1991; and (e) location characteristics.
hese descriptive statistics are presented for 1km’ bands’ of EDs located
ithin 5 km of the project location and for the rest of England (RoE).
rom the table, a clear pattern emerges where EDs close to SRB sites
re home to people who are disadvantaged in comparison to the rest of
ngland, in pretty much all dimensions recorded in the census. In par-
icular, in 1991 before the start of the SRB, those living close to whaties (objects) as point and line features. Each feature consists of geometric and 
ttribute data. Coordinate resolution is 1 metre. 
10 For example, consider an OA that has a population of 100, and shares 90% 
f its area with ED 1 and 10% of its area with ED 2. In this case, we attribute 
0 inhabitants to ED 1 and 10 inhabitants to ED 2. We repeat this procedure for 
ach OA and aggregate the resulting data to ED level. That is, each ED may ‘re- 
eive’ inhabitants from multiple OAs, which we then sum together to construct 
ur final dataset. We use similar approach to approximate, say, the number of 
mployed residents and calculate the ED level employment rate by dividing the 









4 ill become SRB sites tend to have lower employment rates than those
iving further away. 
Table 2 presents averages for the same set of variables for EDs with
 km of SRB projects, broken down by the rounds in which the project
as funded. It shows some variation across rounds – particularly in
erms of workplace employment in the EDs within 1 km of SRB sites – al-
hough no systematic pattern emerges. Consistent with this, the number
f residents, the employment rate of residents and other demographic
haracteristics are broadly constant across rounds. 11 Given our discus-
ion in Section 3 about the process for decision making, we view these
ariations as a random outcome rather than systematic and assume that
nterventions in later rounds are not targeted at areas that are system-
tically any different from areas targeted in earlier rounds. 
The differences and similarities documented in Tables 1 and 2 moti-
ate the identification strategies discussed in the following two sections.
he key challenge in evaluating the impact of any policy intervention
s the construction of a plausible control group that allows us to assess
hat would have happened in the absence of intervention. The way in
hich we achieve this varies by the outcome of interest and is condi-
ioned by the time-span of data available (1991 and 2001 for employ-
ent rate data; annually from 1997 to 2009 for employment) and the
elationship of this to the timing of the different SRB rounds. 
. Effect on workplace employment 
We start with the effect on workplace employment. All schemes we
onsider were designed to increase local employment by increasing the
mount, or improving the quality of commercial space in the treated11 The most notable difference is that the raw workplace employment growth 
s clearly smaller in round 5 than in the other rounds (4 and 6) that received SRB 
unding between 1997 and 2009. This difference is likely to reflect the smaller 
hare of projects located in London in round 5. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics (sample means within 1 km of an SRB site, by round). 
Locations within 1 km of SRB site in round 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
A: Workplace employment 
1997 459 755 514 323 305 548 
2009 497 741 509 397 324 605 
Change 1997 to 2009 44 − 12 4 77 21 66 
B: Number of residents 
1991 437 364 428 469 468 425 
2001 481 446 463 489 489 462 
C: Employment rate of residents 
1991 0.51 0.53 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.49 
2001 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.52 0.53 0.54 
Change 1991 to 2001 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 
D: Other resident characteristics in 1991 
Has a higher degree 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Has a degree 0.07 0.1 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.05 
Has diploma 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Lone parent 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Non-white 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.12 0.1 
Foreign born (Commonwealth) 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.05 
Foreign born (RoW) 0.06 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 
Lives in owner occupied housing 0.56 0.44 0.53 0.55 0.59 0.55 
Lives in social housing 0.32 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.31 0.32 
Does not have a car 0.45 0.5 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.49 
Moved from outside of ward within x years 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.09 
Population density 6361 10,023 6848 6625 6153 6876 
E: Characteristics of the Location 
in London 0.38 0.54 0.28 0.15 0.06 0.17 
Urban 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.93 0.95 0.95 
Number of EDs 982 1054 1827 1693 1384 2092 
Number of SRB projects 27 22 36 23 25 33 


























































12 This feature sets SRB apart from programs such as US Enter- 
prise/Empowerment Zones, in which the interventions are targeted at im- 
proving outcomes for discretely bounded areas. In contrast, SRB interventions 
were designed to benefit loosely defined areas ‘close to the scheme’. 
13 This sample restriction facilitates comparisons across specifications and time 
periods. rea (and it was this development that we used to geo-locate the SRB
roject). That is, they provided a subsidy to a factor of production (built
pace) on the assumption that it was complementary to labour and so
ould increase employment, and that physical redevelopment would
ead to additional employment gains by attracting more capital to the
urrounding area. Thus, a logical first step is to examine whether the ad-
itional commercial space led to more jobs being located in the targeted
eighbourhoods. We have workplace employment data for 1997–2009.
reas close to SRB projects in rounds 1 to 3 (1995/6 to 1997/8) have al-
eady begun to receive treatment by 1997, so we have no pre-treatment
mployment data for rounds 1 to 3, given the timing of the rounds. Thus
e have to focus attention on rounds 4 to 6 in order to consider changes
ver time. 
.1. Baseline estimates 
Our aim is to estimate whether the change in workplace employment
 Δ𝑦 𝑖𝑡 ) in enumeration district i between 1997 and time t is affected by
RB policy ‘treatment’. We start with regressions that define an enu-
eration district ED) to be “treated ” if it is within a given distance of
 round 4 to 6 SRB project (launched in 1998–2000). More precisely,
e define treatment using indicator variables 𝐷 𝐾 
𝑖 
that take the value
ne if there is a round 4 to 6 SRB site within distance K of enumeration
istrict i, and zero otherwise. Using these distance bands, we estimate
egressions: 
𝑦 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛽𝐾 𝐷 𝐾 𝑖 + 𝑥 
′
𝑖 0 𝛾 + 𝜀 𝑖𝑡 (1)
here Δ𝑦 𝑖𝑡 and 𝐷 𝐾 𝑖 are as defined above, 𝑥 𝑖 0 are observable factors spe-
ific to ED i in the pre-policy period that may affect changes in employ-
ent over time, and 𝜀 𝑖𝑡 is an error term capturing the impact of unob-
ervable factors that vary over time and place. Since the spatial scale of
he potential treatment effect is not known a priori , we report estimates
sing different distance bands to define whether an ED is ‘close’ to an5 RB site. 12 We start by considering the longest possible time difference
to 2009) but then use shorter time windows to see whether the effects
iffer across time. In our preferred specifications, the vector 𝑥 𝑖 0 also con-
rols for nearest SRB site-specific constants (SRB site fixed effects). The
stimation sample is restricted to the subset of observations for which
he dependent and observable variables are available in 1997 and in all
ears 2003 to 2009. 13 
As usual, the identification challenge arises because unobservable
actors that affect employment may be correlated with SRB treatment,
ot least because policy deliberately targeted SRB sites to economically
isadvantaged areas. The fact that we examine changes in employment
elps deal with time-invariant unobservable factors that may affect both
he level of employment and treatment. Consistent estimation of the
reatment effects thus requires that ED-specific unobservables which af-
ect changes in employment over time ( 𝜀 𝑖𝑡 ) are independent of SRB treat-
ent status (i.e. a ‘parallel trends’ assumption), at least conditional on
he set of included control variables (a ‘Conditional Independence As-
umption’ or CIA). 
Table 3 presents the coefficients and standard errors when estimat-
ng Eq. (1) for long differences from 1997 to 2009. The standard errors
re clustered by nearest SRB site across all rounds. The first row reports
esults when including no additional control variables. The point esti-
ate suggests that EDs close to SRB sites added 17 jobs per ED more
han EDs elsewhere in England. Note, however, that the estimate is not
tatistically significant. 
We next add nearest SRB fixed effects to control for time-invariant
nobservables that are common to neighbouring EDs (second row). Con-
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Table 3 
Effect of treatment rounds 4 to 6 on change in workplace employment 1997 to 2009. 
Bandwidth 
< 1km < 2km < 3km < 4km < 5km 
Baseline 17.50 9.223 5.592 0.511 0.353 
(12.76) (7.834) (7.873) (4.645) (3.900) 
Controlling for nearest SRB fixed-effects 22.17 ∗ 12.23 7.671 0.185 0.554 
(12.34) (8.441) (10.27) (5.034) (3.634) 
… and 1991 residental characteristics 27.21 ∗ ∗ 17.89 ∗ ∗ 14.25 7.160 7.869 ∗ ∗ 
(aEDED level) (12.30) (8.207) (10.27) (5.157) (3.955) 
… and 1991 residental characteristics 27.16 ∗ ∗ 14.50 ∗ 8.567 − 0.847 − 2.614 
(at neighborhood level) (12.45) (7.802) (9.180) (4.814) (4.013) 
Number EDs 96,473 96,473 96,473 96,473 96,473 
Adj-R squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Number SRB site f.e. 103 111 121 132 138 
Note: ∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗ ∗ , ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Dependent variable is change in workplace employment 1997 to 2009. First row reports results 
from OLS regression for coefficient on dummy variable taking value 1 if the ED is within km of an SRB site and zero otherwise. Each column presents results as 
k increases from 1 to 5 km. Rows 2 to 4 in each panel add additional controls as described in the text. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by nearest SRB. 













































Effect of treatment rounds 4 to 6 on change in workplace employment. 
Bandwidth 
< 1km < 2km < 3km < 4km < 5km 
1997–2003 8.079 − 4.164 − 5.945 − 6.812 ∗ − 0.514 
(9.693) (5.645) (4.946) (3.668) (3.626) 
1997–2004 6.620 2.332 0.621 − 4.910 − 2.697 
(8.383) (5.562) (7.079) (3.263) (3.061) 
1997–2005 22.10 7.554 1.936 − 1.572 − 1.769 
(14.18) (6.068) (7.898) (3.266) (3.130) 
1997–2006 24.79 ∗ 9.489 3.701 − 0.793 − 1.500 
(13.07) (6.841) (8.650) (3.767) (3.342) 
1997–2007 23.67 ∗ 8.247 3.177 − 2.208 − 3.138 
(12.18) (6.931) (8.909) (3.945) (3.694) 
1997–2008 20.94 ∗ ∗ 9.508 1.732 − 4.943 − 5.353 
(10.38) (6.396) (6.882) (4.136) (3.797) 
1997–2009 27.16 ∗ ∗ 14.50 ∗ 8.567 − 0.847 − 2.614 
(12.45) (7.802) (9.180) (4.814) (4.013) 
Number EDs 96,476 96,476 96,476 96,476 96,476 
Number SRB site f.e. 103 111 121 132 138 
Note: ∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗ ∗ , ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Depen- 
dent variable is change in the workplace employment for years as indicated 
in column 1. All rows report results from OLS regression for coefficient on 
dummy variable taking value 1 if the ED is within km of an SRB site and zero 
otherwise. Each column presents results as k increases from 1 to 5 km. All 
rows include nearest SRB fixed effects and full set of controls. Standard er- 
rors (in parentheses) clustered by nearest SRB. Adjusted R-squared is for final 










c  rolling for geographical location in this way leads to a point estimate of
2 jobs per ED, and makes the association between employment growth
nd proximity to an SRB site statistically significant at 10% level. Adding
 full set of residential characteristics of the ED in 1991 (third row) fur-
her increases the point estimate to 27 jobs per ED and makes the esti-
ates significant at 5% level. Finally, the estimates are not affected by
ontrolling for residential characteristics of neighbouring EDs in 1991
fourth row). 14 
The estimates reported in the bottom two rows of Table 3 suggest
hat areas within 1 km of SRB sites experienced faster employment
rowth than comparable locations elsewhere in England. In the remain-
ng columns, we report estimates using wider distance bands. The es-
imates become gradually smaller as we loosen the definition of being
close ” to an SRB site. This pattern of results suggests that employment
rowth mainly occurs within 1 km of where the subsidised business floor
pace was built: As we move from < 1 km to < 2 km the number of EDs
oughly doubles, and the effect halves consistent with positive employ-
ent effects at < 1 km now being averaged across more EDs. 
Two limitations need to be taken into account when interpreting the
stimates reported in Table 3 . First, the SRB was targeted towards de-
lining neighbourhoods. While we are able to condition on the ED fixed-
ffects and a rich set of background characteristics – and the allocation
rocess appeared to contain random elements as discussed in Section 2
bove – it is possible that the policymakers had information on the ex-
ected decline of a neighbourhood that is not available for us. If such
nformation were used to target declining areas, our estimates would
e biased downwards. This conjecture is supported by the fact that the
stimates become larger as we condition on observable characteristics.
hus, if we could also condition on the relevant unobservable charac-
eristics, the estimates would likely become even larger than those re-
orted in Table 3 . In the appendix, we use the formalisation of this idea
y Altonji et al. (2005) and Oster (2019) to examine the likely extent of
he bias. The Oster bounds for the specifications conditioning on 1991
esidential characteristics are about 30 jobs per ED. Importantly, all es-
imates and bounds suggest that the SRB increased the number of jobs
ocated at or close to the SRB sites. 
The second limitation is that increases in jobs in “treated ” EDs
 < 1 km) may come at the expense of displacing jobs from locations fur-
her away in the larger neighbourhood. Comparison of the estimates
cross the columns of Table 3 suggests that this may be, at least partly,
he case. Given the number of EDs in each of the distance rings (see14 These findings are robust to using fixed effects based on Local Authority, 
ather than nearest SRB. Results are also robust to clustering by LA for EDs that 






6 able 1 ), we would expect the coefficient in the < 2 km, < 3 km, < 4 km
nd < 5 km bands to be, respectively, around one-half, one-third, one-
uarter and one-fifth of that in the 0–1 km band if the employment ef-
ects are positive within 1 km and zero elsewhere (relative to the > 5 km
ontrol group). This is indeed what we see up to 3 km in Table 3 , but
ot for the final two columns suggesting that some displacement may
e occurring from places further than 3 km from the SRB site. 
.2. Dynamics 
Table 4 shows the pattern of results over time for specifications in-
luding nearest SRB fixed effects, residential characteristics of the ED in
991 and residential characteristics of neighbouring EDs in 1991. These
pecifications are comparable to those in the fourth row of Table 3 (in-
eed, the final row simply replicates the results for 1997 to 2009). The
able shows that positive employment effects can be detected around
hree years after round 6 is completed (i.e. 2005) and they grow some-




























































Effect of treatment rounds 4 to 6 on change in workplace employment 1997 to 
2009, by distance to SRB project for EDs within 5 km of Round 4 to 6 project. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
0 – 1 km 15.74 19.44 23.23 ∗ 26.18 ∗ ∗ 
(15.73) (13.45) (12.95) (12.98) 
1 – 2 km 2.709 5.799 8.017 5.915 
(15.19) (13.81) (13.68) (12.15) 
2 – 3 km 10.12 12.07 13.37 14.18 
(13.98) (15.94) (15.37) (14.05) 
3 – 4 km − 11.59 − 11.80 − 8.886 − 5.324 
(8.424) (12.47) (12.24) (10.79) 
4 – 5 km . . . . 
Number EDs 25,866 25,866 25,866 25,866 
Adj R-squared 0.000 − 0.000 0.009 0.016 
Number SRB sites 76 76 76 76 
Controlling for 
Nearest SRB FE no yes yes yes 
1991 residentialEDED) no no yes yes 
1991 residential (neighbourhood) no no no yes 
Note: Reports results from OLS regression for coefficients on distance band 
dummy variables as defined in the text. Additional controls are as described 






























1  hat over time. 15 As in the final row of Table 3 , the coefficients are only
ver significant in the closest distance bands. 
The time profile of estimated employment effects does raise the con-
ern that the results in Table 3 may underestimate the effects of rounds
 to 6 if EDs close to rounds 1 to 3 appear in the controls. Results in the
nline appendix suggest that these concerns are largely unwarranted.
e can drop any observations that are within k km of a round 1 to 3
roject (with k varying from 1 to 5 km as we move across the columns)
r even take the more conservative approach of dropping all observa-
ions within 5 km of a round 1 to 3 project. In both cases, we still find a
ignificant positive effect of round 4 to 6 on employment from around
005 onwards. 
.3. Local comparisons 
An alternative approach for examining the impact of the SRB is to
xploit the spatial detail in our data and to directly compare EDs close
o an SRB scheme to EDs somewhat further away from the same scheme.
his approach builds on the insight that the largest workplace employ-
ent effects should occur at (or near to) the commercial development
hat is located at the ‘centre’ of the scheme. 16 As noted above, the results
eported in Tables 3 and 4 are in line with this assumption. 
As in Gibbons (2015) and Einiö and Overman (2020) , we implement
his idea by using EDs that are within 5 km of a round 4 to 6 SRB site
o estimate: 
𝑦 𝑖𝑡 = μ + 
∑
𝐾 
𝛽𝐾 𝐷 𝑘 
𝑖 
+ 𝑥 ′
𝑖 0 𝛾 + 𝜀 𝑖𝑡 (2)
here Δ𝑦 𝑖𝑡 is defined as above, and 𝐷 𝑘 𝑖 are a series of indicator variables
aking value one if the ED is within k to k-1 km of an SRB site, zero oth-
rwise, and all other variables are defined as before. We use 𝐷 5 
𝑖 
as the
mitted category. Thus, the parameters 𝛽𝐾 measure the change in em-
loyment for EDs located k to k-1 km from an SRB site in comparison to
Ds 4 to 5 km of an SRB site (the omitted category). As before, in our pre-
erred specifications, the vector 𝑥 𝑖 0 controls for nearest SRB site-specific
onstants (SRB site fixed effects) and we restrict the sample to the subset
f observations for which the dependent and observable variables are
vailable in 1997 and in all years 2003 to 2009. 17 The restriction to EDs
ith 5 km of a round 4 to 6 site helps control for time-varying shocks
hat are common across all areas close to SRB round 4 to 6 sites. 
Estimates of Eq. (2) measure the impact of the SRB on local jobs
nder the identifying assumption that areas 4–5 km away from an SRB
ite are not affected by the intervention. This assumption would be vi-
lated if the SRB led to a relocation of jobs from the 4–5 km area into
r close to the SRB sites. In this case, the control group would be nega-
ively affected and the estimates for 𝛽𝐾 would be biased upwards. Thus,
he resulting estimates can be interpreted as upper bounds for the true
ffect. On the other hand, the baseline estimates are likely to be, if any-
hing, biased downwards and can thus be interpreted as lower bounds
see above). Thus, these two sets of estimates together provide plausible
ounds for the true treatment effect. 
Table 5 presents the results from estimating Eq. (2) . 18 The first col-
mn reports results when including no additional control variables. The15 Results not reported here show that the statistical significant of findings in 
arly years are more reliant on the introduction of controls - fixed effects at a 
inimum, but some years need all controls for significance. 
16 To be precise this is the centre of the scheme given the way in which we have 
eo-located projects. It is possible that other SRB activities are not necessarily 
entred on the commercial development site introducing some measurement 
rror for the employment rate regressions as we discuss further below. 
17 This sample restriction facilitates comparisons across specifications and time 
eriods. 
18 The standard errors are robust to clustering by ring and SRB site. That is, we 
ave one cluster for EDs within 1 km of SRB round 4 to 6 project A, one cluster 
or EDs within 2 km of SRB round 4 to 6 project A, …, one cluster for EDs within 












7 stimates show that EDs close to round 4 to 6 SRB sites experienced
arger changes in employment than EDs 4–5 km from 4 to 6 SRB sites, al-
hough the difference is not statistically significant. The remaining three
olumns sequentially add fixed effects for the nearest SRB project (col-
mn 2), residential characteristics of the ED in 1991 (third row) and
esidential characteristics of neighbouring EDs in 1991 (fourth row).
he resulting pattern is very similar to that reported in Table 3 , using
he alternative specification of Eq. (1) : the estimates become larger and
tatistically significant as we add control variables to the specification. 
Table 6 shows the pattern of results over time for specifications in-
luding nearest SRB fixed effects, residential characteristics of the ED
n 1991 and residential characteristics of neighbouring EDs in 1991.
hese specifications are comparable to those in the fourth column of
able 5 (again, the final column replicates the results for 1997 to 2009).
he table shows that for Eq. (2) positive employment effects can be de-
ected earlier than for Eq. (1) – specifically in the year after round 4 is
ompleted (i.e. 2003) and they again grow somewhat over time. 
As with Eq. (1) , the time profile of estimated employment effects
aises the concern that the results in Table 3 may underestimate the
ffects of rounds 4 to 6 if EDs close to rounds 1 to 3 appear in the
ontrols. To check for this, we drop any ED that is within 5 km of a
ound 1 to 3 SRB site, as these will have already been treated at least
nce by 1997. This gives us a set of ED that are within 5 km of a round
 to 6 SRB project, but more than 5 km from a round 1 to 3. Results
eported in the online appendix suggest that, if anything, including these
Ds causes us to slightly over-estimate, rather than under-estimate the
ffects of treatment. 
Overall, these results suggest that employment increased at SRB
roject sites, but there are no statistically significant impacts beyond
 km. 19 In line with the results reported in Table 3 , the coefficients in
able 5 suggest that the positive effects within 1 km of the site do not
ome at the expense of areas immediately nearby: The signs on the coef-
cients in the 1–2 and 2–3 km band are positive, although insignificant.
f there is displacement, it is from areas more than 3 km away from the
RB site, where the sign turns negative. Clearly, the existence of this
ind of displacement implies that treatment by an SRB site is affecting
he control EDs, so our estimate is not causal, in the sense of an SRB site
dding to overall employment. Even so, SRB generates ‘additional-to-
he-area’ employment close to SRB sites, relative to those further away,19 Although, formally, we cannot reject equality of the coefficients. For exam- 
le, a t-test for the equality of the coefficients on kilometre 0-1 km and 1-2 km 
as a p-value of 0.33. 
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Table 6 
Effect of treatment rounds 4 to 6 on change in workplace employment by distance to SRB project for all EDs within 5 km of Round 4 to 6 project. 
− 2003 − 2004 − 2005 − 2006 − 2007 − 2008 − 2009 
0 – 1 km 16.87 10.43 26.70 ∗ 28.22 ∗ ∗ 28.14 ∗ ∗ 22.99 ∗ ∗ 26.18 ∗ ∗ 
(11.14) (9.343) (14.42) (13.08) (12.10) (10.96) (12.98) 
1 – 2 km − 6.661 1.584 0.723 0.561 − 0.211 8.197 5.915 
(10.09) (9.350) (10.65) (10.71) (11.08) (10.23) (12.15) 
2 – 3 km − 1.094 9.185 1.808 3.554 6.543 6.497 14.18 
(11.89) (12.26) (13.74) (14.26) (14.95) (12.14) (14.05) 
3 – 4 km − 12.21 − 8.972 − 2.986 − 1.852 − 3.285 − 4.586 − 5.324 
(8.976) (10.32) (10.34) (10.56) (11.14) (9.505) (10.79) 
4 – 5 km . . . . . . . 
Number EDs 25,866 25,866 25,866 25,866 25,866 25,866 25,866 
Note: Reports results from OLS regression for coefficients on distance band dummy variables as defined in the text. Additional controls are as described in the text. 


















































































o  ut within 5 km. The question remains as to whether these localised
mployment increases benefited the policy target group, that is the peo-
le living nearby. To answer this question, we now turn to whether the
RB commercial space projects and their associated active labour mar-
et measures lead to higher employment rates for local residents. 
. Effect on residence-based employment rates 
There are two reasons why we might see an effect on employment
ates for residents living close to SRB projects. First, because there are
ore local jobs as documented in the previous section, employment
ates of residents should increase if they take some of those jobs. Sec-
nd, because we know that SRB projects involve other activities that are
pecifically aimed at improving employment rates for local residents. If
hose additional local jobs go to local residents, or if the other support
easures are effective, then local employment rates should improve. 
.1. Baseline estimates 
As for employment, we start by estimating Eq. (1) , which allows for
n effect on employment rates if an ED is within K kilometres of an
ctive SRB site. We have employment rate data for 1991 and 2001 and
o focus only on the treatment effect of projects funded in rounds 1 to
. 20 Results when estimating Eq. (1) using the change in employment
ates between 1991 and 2001 as the outcome variable are presented in
able 7 . Standard errors are clustered by nearest SRB site, as for Eq. (1) ,
able 3 . 
The structure of the Table is exactly as for Table 3 . To reiterate, the
rst row in each panel presents results when including no additional
ontrol variables. Treatment is defined as within K km of SRB project
ounds 1 to 2 (with K increasing across columns from K = 1, within 1 km;
o K = 5 within 5 km). In order to provide more informative compar-
sons, we gradually add nearest SRB project fixed effects (second row),
esidential characteristics of the ED in 1991 (third row) and residential
haracteristics of neighbouring EDs in 1991 (fourth row). 
The baseline estimates show that residents living close to an SRB
ite experience slower growth in their employment rates than those
iving elsewhere. Given that the SRB projects were targeted at declining
reas, this comparison is unlikely to measure the causal impact of the
rogramme. However, once we add SRB fixed effects and pre-treatment
esidential characteristics, we continue to find no significant effect20 We focus on these two rounds in order to make timing of the analysis of 
orkplace and resident based employment as comparable as possible. That is, 
ounds 4-6 were launched in 1998-2000 and the estimates for workplace em- 
loyment become statistically significant in 2006 (see Table 4 ). In comparison, 
RB rounds 1-2 were launched in 1994-1995 and hence the 2001 measures em- 





8 n employment rates. 21 Areas close to SRB sites tended to experience
hanges in employment rates that were no different to other comparable
reas. 
Similar to our analysis of workplace employment, we carried out an
ster bounds analysis ( Oster, 2019 ). The Thin the online appendix). As
e discuss in Section 5 (and in the appendix), these estimates answer
he question: “What would the treatment effect be, if selection on unob-
ervables would be as important as selection on observables? ” All of our
stimates addressing this question are close to zero and slightly negative.
urthermore, the observable characteristics included in our data explain
ore than 40% of the variation in the change of local employment rates.
aken together with, Tables 3 , 5 these results thus strongly suggest that
hile the SRB projects affected local workplace employment, the new
obs seem to have little, if any, effect on local employment rates. 
.2. Using later rounds as a control group 
For employment rates, we can achieve more credible identification
y following Busso et al. (2013) and using projects in later rounds, yet
o be funded, as a control group for the projects treated prior to 2001.
pecifically, we compare changes over time for EDs that benefit from
RB-interventions in early rounds 1 and 2 to EDs that will benefit from
RB interventions in later rounds. Round 5 provided funding for projects
asting from 1 to 7 years after June 1999, but the overall spend for
ound 5 was anticipated to be £1.25 billion with only £75 million of
his in 1999 and 2000. 22 Given this timing, we assume that any impacts
rom the larger Round 5 projects and all Round 6 projects will have
ost-dated the April 2001 Census, and use EDs exposed to projects in
hese final rounds as control areas. The idea underlying this approach
s that EDs receiving SRB-treatment at a given point in time should be
uch more comparable to EDs receiving an intervention at some other
ime, than to EDs that never receive treatment. 
We implement this idea by restricting the sample to EDs close to
chemes in rounds 1, 2, 5 and 6 and estimating Eq. (1) , but with treat-
ent 𝐷 𝐾 
𝑖 
redefined to be an indicator variable taking the value one if
here is a round 1 to 2 SRB site within distance K km of enumeration
istrict i, and zero for EDs within K km of a round 5 to 6 project. As
efore, we allow K to increase across columns from K = 1 (within 1 km)
o K = 5 (within 5 km) and restrict the sample to EDs within K km of a
ound 1 to 2 or 5 to 6 project. For example, when K = 1, we compare
hanges in the employment rate of residents living in EDs within 1 km
f round 1 to 2 SRB site the change in employment rate of those living21 Results in show that this finding is robust to dropping all ED within 5 km of 
 round 3 or 4 project (which may have received some treatment by 2001). 
22 These figures come from the “SRB Round 5 bidding guidance: a guide 
or partnerships ” available from the National Archives http://webarchive. 
ationalarchives.gov.uk/20120919132719/www.communities.gov.uk/ 
ocuments/regeneration/pdf/155889.pdf (accessed May 2018). 
S. Gibbons, H. Overman and M. Sarvimäki Journal of Urban Economics 122 (2021) 103315 
Table 7 
Effect of treatment rounds 1 and 2 on change in employment rate 1991 to 2001. 
Bandwidth 
< 1km < 2km < 3km < 4km < 5km 
Baseline − 0.013 ∗ ∗ − 0.010 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0077 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0083 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0077 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.00629) (0.00378) (0.00294) (0.00258) (0.00246) 
Controlling for nearest SRB fixed-effects − 0.0137 ∗ ∗ − 0.0105 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0077 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0083 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0077 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.00629) (0.00378) (0.00294) (0.00258) (0.00246) 
… and 1991 residental characteristics − 0.0104 − 0.00730 ∗ − 0.00412 − 0.00338 − 0.00182 
(at ED level) (0.00693) (0.00438) (0.00369) (0.00318) (0.00274) 
… and 1991 residental characteristics − 0.00783 − 0.00500 − 0.00195 − 0.00085 0.00112 
(at neighborhood level) (0.00607) (0.00379) (0.00313) (0.00298) (0.00273) 
Number EDs 101,570 101,570 101,570 101,570 101,570 
Adj-R squared 
Number SRB sites 63 63 63 63 63 
Note: Dependent variable is change in residential employment rate 1991 to 2001. First row reports results from OLS regression for coefficient on dummy variable 
taking value 1 if the ED is within km of an SRB site and zero otherwise. Each column presents results as k increases from 1 to 5 km. Rows 2 to 4 in each panel add 
additional controls as described in the text. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by nearest SRB. 
Table 8 
Effect of treatment rounds 1 and 2 on change in employment rate 1991 to 2001, relative to rounds 5 to 6. 
Bandwidth 
< 1km < 2km < 3km < 4km < 5km 
Baseline − 0.00097 0.0030 0.0060 0.0038 0.0024 
(0.00816) (0.0056) (0.0047) (0.0043) (0.0042) 
Controlling for nearest SRB fixed-effects − 0.014 − 0.0024 0.0011 − 0.0022 − 0.0059 
(0.0099) (0.0054) (0.0047) (0.0040) (0.0042) 
… and 1991 residental characteristics − 0.0150 0.00296 0.00049 − 0.0031 − 0.0027 
(at ED level) (0.0096) (0.0059) (0.0062) (0.0050) (0.0039) 
… and 1991 residental characteristics − 0.016 ∗ ∗ − 0.0016 − 0.00089 − 0.0030 − 0.0017 
(at neighborhood level) (0.0073) (0.0063) (0.0050) (0.0045) (0.0034) 
Number EDs 5212 12,210 19,911 26,854 32,192 
Adj-R squared 0.382 0.360 0.365 0.372 0.380 
Number SRB sites 63 63 63 63 63 
Note: Dependent variable is change in residential employment rate 1991 to 2001. First row reports results from OLS regression for coefficient on dummy variable 
taking value 1 if the ED is within km of an SRB site and zero otherwise. Each column presents results as k increases from 1 to 5 km. Rows 2 to 4 in each panel add 










































T  ithin 1 km of round 5 to 6 site. Errors are clustered by nearest SRB site
cross all rounds. 
Table 8 presents results from this comparison of round 1 and 2 treat-
ent with round 5 and 6 controls. The dependent variables are, as be-
ore, the change in residence-based employment rates from 1991 to
001. The first row reports results when including no additional con-
rol variables. We progressively add in nearest SRB fixed effects (second
ow), residential characteristics of the ED in 1991 (third row) and res-
dential characteristics of neighbouring EDs in 1991 (fourth row). Pro-
iding that SRB neighbourhoods are defined to be smaller than local
abour markets (which seems likely), estimation of Eq. (3) should pro-
ide us with a reasonable estimate of the effect on employment rates
f the increase in employment identified in Tables 3 –5 . Once again, we
nd no significant (positive) effects on employment rates across all spec-
fications and distance bands. 23 
.3. Local comparisons 
For completeness, we end with a similar spatial differencing ap-
roach to that we used in Table 5 to examine workplace employment.
hat is, we once again exploit the spatial detail in our data to compare
Ds close to an SRB scheme to EDs somewhat further away from the23 As before, results in show that this finding is robust to dropping all ED within 







9 ame scheme. This approach will capture the impact of other interven-
ions – e.g. employment training – provided as part of the SRB projects
hat were targeted at smaller spatial scales than the 5 km SRB neigh-
ourhoods that we have constructed. We implement it by estimating
q. (2) for employment rates, with timing changed to reflect the avail-
bility of data. Specifically, we now use EDs that are within 5 km of a
ound 1 to 2 SRB site. 
Table 9 presents the results of this approach, estimating
q. (2) for long differences in employment rates from 1991 to
001 on this restricted sample. The first column reports results when
ncluding no additional control variables. The remaining three columns
equentially add fixed effects for the nearest SRB project (column 2),
esidential characteristics of the ED in 1991 (third row) and residential
haracteristics of neighbouring EDs in 1991 (fourth row). As with
ables 7 and 8 , we find no (positive) significant effects of SRB on
mployment rates. 
. Implied cost per job 
In order to interpret the magnitude of our estimates, and to compare
hem to previous studies, we end with rough cost per job calculations.
he estimates reported in Tables 3 and 5 suggest that the average local
mpact of an SRB project was an increase of around 25 jobs per ED within
 km of a round 4 to 6 project. There were 8,267 EDs within 1 km of a
ound 1 to 6 project. Assuming that the scale and pattern of employment
ffects were similar for round 1 to 3 projects as for round 4 to 6 projects,
his suggests a total increase in workplace-based employment of 206,675
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Table 9 
Effect of treatment rounds 1 to 2 on change in employment rate 1991 to 2001, by distance to SRB project for alEDED within 5 km of Round 1 to 2 project. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
0 – 1 km − 0.00654 − 0.00866 ∗ − 0.00908 ∗ − 0.00684 
(0.00756) (0.00520) (0.00527) (0.00441) 
1 – 2 km − 0.00437 − 0.00627 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.00635 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.00447 ∗ ∗ 
(0.00503) (0.00230) (0.00208) (0.00194) 
2 – 3 km 0.00506 0.000624 − 0.00134 0.00108 
(0.00531) (0.00248) (0.00261) (0.00230) 
3 – 4 km − 0.000848 − 0.00300 − 0.00310 − 0.00159 
(0.00577) (0.00286) (0.00282) (0.00236) 
4 – 5 km . . . . 
Number EDs 17,574 17,574 17,574 17,574 
Adj R-squared 0.001 0.067 0.313 0.345 
Number SRB sites 63 63 63 63 
Controlling for 
Nearest SRB FE no yes yes yes 
1991 residential (ED) no no yes yes 
1991 residential (neighbourhood) no no no yes 
Note: Reports results from OLS regression for coefficients on distance band dummy variables as defined in the text. Additional controls are as described in the text. 















































































obs. With a total cost of £8.2 billion, the implied cost per job created is
39,675. 
Even ignoring the possibility that these jobs may have been
isplaced from elsewhere, the implied cost per job is higher than
or other labour market interventions in the welfare-to-work field
e.g. Van Reenen, 2004 ; Black et al., 2003 ). It is also high relative to
ther UK area-based policies. For example, Criscuolo et al. (2012) es-
imate a cost per job of £6885 for UK Regional Selective Assistance. In
hort, although we cannot say anything about the type and quality of
obs created given the data available, the cost per job figure for SRB
eems high. Turning to the employment of local residents, our point
stimates are generally negative and statistically insignificant, even
ith adjustments for a plausible degree of selection on unobservables.
t seems likely that building new business floor space in deprived
eighbourhoods had no effect on the employment of local residents,
espite creating some jobs at a high cost. 
. Conclusions 
Many governments attempt to help people living in deprived neigh-
ourhoods by providing financial incentives for firms to locate into these
reas. While such “place-making ” policies are often popular among
olicymakers, economists typically remain sceptical about the cost-
fficiency of these initiatives. However, empirical evidence informing
his debate remains limited due to the scarcity of data and research de-
igns that would allow for plausible impact evaluations. 
In this paper, we study the local economic impacts of a major re-
eneration programme that aimed to enhance the quality of life of local
eople in deprived neighbourhoods in the UK. We focus on a subset
f projects implemented as part of the UK’s Single Regeneration Budget
SRB) between 1994 and 2002. During this period, the SRB was the main
egeneration fund in the UK, and it allocated a considerable amount of
ublic funds to local projects. The total expenditure of the 165 projects
e examine was £8.2bn. 
Using several identification strategies and remarkably detailed data,
e find that subsidising the development of commercial space through
he SRB created some additional workplace employment in the targeted
laces (although we can only partially assess to what extent these were
isplaced from further afield). However, despite the increase of new
ocal jobs, we find no evidence that these jobs went to local people or
mproved the employment outcomes of local residents. Moreover, we
an rule out the possibility that these projects were a cost-efficient way
o improve local employment. Thus our study provides an example of
he challenges government face when trying to help the residents of
eprived neighbourhoods by “bringing jobs ” to them. 10 RediT authorship contribution statement 
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